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THE ORIGIN OF ENGLISH POLITICAL PARTIES

Of all political movements in recent times none is of more profound and far-reaching importance than that by which representative government, a century and a quarter ago confined to Anglo-Saxon peoples, has been extended to all states possessing or pretending to modern civilization. The cause of this phenomenon is not far to seek. A triumphing democracy finding in this system a practical compromise between strong administration and popular control suited to its needs, has seized upon it as a means of expression, a weapon, and an administrative device. It has become a universal test of liberalism and a fetish of popular government. And though there are not wanting signs of its failure to meet the expectations of its most ardent champions, and portents of its imminent modification to meet ideas and conditions which it has itself largely produced, it is, none the less, regarded by most men as the best contrivance yet proposed to convert national opinion into governmental action, to make and keep central authority sensitive to popular will. Above all, perhaps, it is the only system yet devised by which democracy can be extended to wide areas.

Including an executive and a judiciary, independent of each other and, save in cases of last resort, of the legislature, its fundamental conception, that of a central motive force embodied in an assembly drawn from all districts, classes, and interests of the nation and exercising virtual sovereignty, differentiates it from all other systems. With monarchy and oligarchy, the only forms of government which prior to its appearance were available for the administration of great territories and populations, it may be fitly compared in the incidence and efficiency of its functions. But from them it differs fundamentally in the very essence of its existence, the initiative and control of government by those upon whom it operates. There it is on an equality with such pure democracies as those of Athens and the Swiss cantons. But from them it differs in that the system they represent is incapable of territorial or numerical extension beyond narrow limits.

One might naturally suppose, therefore, that under this form of government the means by which central authority related itself to popular will would be fully provided by constitutional measures, but this is far from the fact. Constitutions supply this important rela-

tion partially or imperfectly, if at all, and the severest lesson which young democracy has to learn is that no automatic devices, least of all laws and charters, can permanently insure the honesty and efficiency of popular government. For these, many forces must be set in motion within the constitutional framework to effect that vital connection between people and administration without which statutes grow inoperative or oppressive and constitutions become curiosities of political theory.

Apart from a sound and active public conscience; the moral, political and intellectual education of the people; the instruments of publicity—press, pulpit, and the hustings—which combine to keep the people, in so far as may be, united and informed, one factor has from the beginning been recognized as absolutely essential to efficient democracy. This is the political party. "Party divisions", said Burke more than a hundred years ago, "whether on the whole operating for good or evil, are things inseparable from free government", and the history of politics since his day has confirmed his dictum in ways that not even he could have dreamed. Parties provide for the constitutional skeleton not merely flesh and blood but, what is fully as important, a nervous system. Public opinion may be formed through many agencies, but it is chiefly by parties that it is translated into action. By them the connection between the head of the state and its members is chiefly maintained. Without them politics tends to the anarchy of groups or the chaos of the mob. Great as their weaknesses and evils may become, parties are not merely inseparable from free government, they are the most potent forces for good or ill in modern political life as it has hitherto been constituted. In any adequate appreciation of recent history, therefore, the study of these organisms yields nothing in interest or importance even to that of constitutions themselves.

In certain ways this has been fully recognized. Few subjects have been as long or as widely discussed. Philosophers and statesmen have debated forms of government since there were philosophers and statesmen, and parties since there were parties. Publicist and politician have vied in their devotion to the subject. Especially in the home of representative government, a long array of writers from Bolingbroke through Burke, Bentham, and Brougham to Boutmy and Bryce have dedicated their talents to its elucidation. Controversy over the theories and practices of the two great English parties has filled two centuries with its clamor, and the inspiration of most English historians of that period has been found in their long rivalry. The concurrent spread of franchise and education in

more recent years has given the discussion wider though not higher range, while party tracts with electors' guides have brought the ancient controversy to every hearth and lodging. It would seem, therefore, in the face of all this, at once rash and useless to reopen a question so long and elaborately discussed. After such endless contributions to the argument there would seem to be nothing left worth saying; though that, indeed, does not appear to have deterred many from entering the field. Yet, with all this, as sometimes happens, certain phases of the question have remained relatively neglected. Of pot-wallopers, in and out burgesses, sixteenth tenements, and the like, thanks to the antiquarian zeal of industrious investigators, we know much. Of the manipulation of the electorate and membership of the Commons, for many purposes far more important to our understanding of English political evolution, we know only too little. It is now many years since Macaulay expressed the wish that some one would write a history of corruption in English politics. The book has not yet appeared, nor is it probable his desire will ever be fulfilled, but the lack of it marks one of many omissions in our knowledge of the past; if it were filled it might not only help our conceptions of earlier periods but might make it possible to draw from it lessons for our own.

Among these neglected fields of party history one, and that neither the least important nor the least interesting, has received curiously little attention. It is that of origin. Upon this vital point the only considerable history of English parties which has yet appeared, touches but lightly, its real story scarcely antedating a time when organizations were fully formed and in active operation. The histories of the period in which these modern parties took their rise give but scanty and unsatisfactory accounts of what is, in some respects, its most important and enduring result. And even the latest writer of party history confines himself to one side of the question and that, from the standpoint of origins, scarcely the most significant. In view of these circumstances it may seem the less presumptuous to attempt such a study as this.

The task is a perplexing one. The gradual transition from one species of ideas and organization to another is easy to apprehend in the result; it is extraordinarily difficult to realize in the process, much less to fix in formal phrase. The ever-varying complexity of motive and action, the perpetual alteration in material conditions and national conceptions, the fluctuation of principle and interest, public and private, the influence of foreign affairs outside the sphere of domestic politics yet strongly influencing them, from the sum of

which emerge a new political situation and mechanism, these are elusive materials for the writing of history. Moreover, at best we are compelled to judge largely by externals. Of the secret conclave, the verbal agreement, the private understanding which make for much in these affairs we can know little or nothing, since few or no records can remain. Forms of organization, like doctrines, are seldom if ever wholly new. To record the assembling of men into combinations based on principles and practices remodelled to meet altering conditions is at best an intangible task, yet it is to this the historian of party origins must address himself.

It is generally agreed that the system of representative government which now obtains throughout the civilized world in various forms first reached its fullest development in England, whence, with more or less modification, it has been adopted by other nations. It is further admitted that its corollary, government by party connection, originated there also, beginning with the English division into Whigs and Tories from which, in a sense, all modern parties are descended. It is further very generally recognized that this system originated at some time during the latter part of the seventeenth century and that it was in active operation, if not fully organized, as early as the Revolution of 1688.

With these admissions, however, general agreement has ended. Concerning the processes by which these groups were formed, the elements from which they were constituted, the circumstances, theories, and methods which produced them, the precise period of their appearance, and still more the identity of their founders, opinion has varied widely. Even within the limited period generally agreed upon as the time when they took their rise, one writer finds their origin in the reign of James II., others in the agitation over the Exclusion Bill, while others push it back, ministry by ministry, to the Restoration itself, and some will not admit the existence of true party life until the reign of Anne, or the establishment of the cabinet system in the reign of George I. One contends that political management, especially by corruption, which is a test of the rise of partizan strife, begins with the Revolution, another finds its origin under Danby, another under Clifford, another under Clarendon.

As to the founder of that great political connection which dominated English affairs for three-quarters of a century after the Revolution, the Whigs, the claims of such widely different leaders as Shaftesbury, Sacheverell, and Clarendon have been urged for that honor, while the latter has the unique distinction of being acclaimed the father of the Tory party as well. Even greater differences of

opinion exist as to the precise period when such devices as the caucus, the programme or platform, central organization, and the concurrent phenomena of a regular party system appeared, and as to their originators—though here, at least, the talents of Shaftesbury are generally conceded pre-eminence and priority in the earliest general use of those popular weapons, agitation and “management”. This shows the incertitude. But the same disputes arise, and must always arise, over all institutions which are the result of growth—disputes endless, inevitable, and in large measure insoluble.

In saying that the modern party system originated in the latter part of the seventeenth century we do not, of course, mean to imply that political divisions expressing themselves in groups called parties had no existence before that time. Such bodies have existed since the political world began. There were parties in Athens. There were parties in Rome under the Republic and the Empire. There were parties before Hastings, and at Runnymede, and the history of England during the fifteenth century is little more than the story of the rivalries between the so-called parties of York and Lancaster. During the reign of James I., and still more in that of his son, much of what we may even recognize as modern party method appears. The word party is, in fact, associated not merely as Burke says with “free governments” and representative systems, but with many administrative forms wholly unfree and unrepresentative.

In modern parties, however, three elements seem essential—a theory of government, a fairly stable and continuous organization, and a purpose to control administration by means of a majority in a representative assembly. Added to these are, of course, the necessary but less permanent characteristics of policies and names, often incorrectly regarded as the real test of organization. How erroneous that opinion is, two instances will demonstrate. Whatever free-trade sentiment existed in England during the greater part of the eighteenth century seems to have been confined to the Tory party; whatever protectionist sentiment obtains now, is to be found principally in the ranks of their Conservative successors. On the other hand that party in the United States which first bore the name Republican came into existence as the champion of doctrines some of which were almost if not precisely opposite to those which its namesake a hundred years later upheld most strongly.

Such divisions have not originated in modern times, nor in temporary circumstances which align men now for, now against, the same policy, nor yet, as some have plausibly maintained, in the mere desire

for the power or profit of office. Behind all these there seems to lie a deeper cause of separation, partly, as we say to-day, psychological, partly economic. Temperamentally this appears to be connected with the tendency of some minds to look back to a golden age and of others to foresee a millennium, with always an indeterminate middle group tending in quiet times to inertia and in more active periods to absorption in the two extremes. In practice these differences are allied with the defense of existing privileges by those who have, and the demand for recognition by those who would have. And on the whole the first party, commonly called conservative, seems generally to favor a more centralized, aristocratic or plutocratic form of government; the latter, or "liberal" party, a more decentralized and popular administration; the former a more military and bureaucratic system, the latter a greater reliance on militia and official rotation.

Such ideas operated in England as in other countries at all times and formed in a sense the basis of action no less in the Middle Ages than now. But for the origin of modern parties we cannot rely on general antagonisms. We must seek definite periods and principles. These have been determined very differently at different times. To the men of the eighteenth century the English political world was created by the Revolution of 1688. Some of the older Tories, indeed, dreamed of an earlier and happier day when their party held the promise of the future. But as time went on that vision faded, and with the accession of George III., a Tory monarch who accepted the Revolution, it disappeared. We have in our day abandoned the cataclysmic theory of origins, in politics as in geology, for that of a more gradual evolution. Yet in the one as in the other, we still recognize that in certain times and places changes occur which are at least far more rapid than the ordinary processes. We are not prepared to admit on that account, however, the claims of the glorious Revolution as the origin of modern political conditions. Further removed from it and its immediate results, with at once a better historical perspective and the inspiration of a triumphing democracy to enlighten us, we have exhumed the age of Cromwell from the royalist tradition which buried it so long, and recognize in it a truer basis of present political conditions than its more decorous sequel of 1688.

We do not mean, however, in the light of our evolutionary doctrine, that even here is to be found the precise origin of either modern theory or practice. For a point of departure of those ideas and conditions whose crystallization produced the modern system, we

must go back at least as far as the Reformation. When these reached their climax in a revolution like that of the civil wars of the seventeenth century by which the older balance of society and the state was readjusted more in accordance with the newer doctrines, and the nation settled back into its old forms with new powers, modern practices were for the first time possible. Such a situation is found in the event we know as the Restoration of 1660. Some time after this and before a period when these new forces are clearly discernible, as in 1688, therefore, we must conclude there were established the principles, methods, and organizations which are the direct progenitors of the party system at present in operation.

The great movement we call the Reformation was essentially on its religious and intellectual side a protest against enthroned authority by private judgment which founded itself on reason and investigation as against dogma. It was preceded or accompanied by many events and movements outside the religious field proper which materially affected its course, like the revival of classical learning, the discovery of a new world, and the rise of a scientific spirit. In some countries it affected society but slightly and politics scarcely at all; and even where it affected both its results were by no means uniform. In England, owing to a variety of causes, it produced a change in society and politics little if any less profound than that in religion. There the religious movement was stimulated and modified by royal activities, public and private. It was further accompanied and affected by a wide-spread change in economic and social conditions, the increase of commerce and agriculture, and the consequent rapid rise of the so-called middle classes which in the main embraced the new religious doctrines, and at nearly the same time, by their great increase in numbers and wealth, began to take a place in public affairs beside the older powers in the state.

The result was the remaking of the nation, economically, intellectually, socially, religiously, and politically. Catholic conservative and Catholic reformer gave way to the sharper division of Catholic and Protestant. The crown broke away from papal supremacy, the Roman church in England was disestablished and disendowed, and finally replaced by an Anglican church set up by the government, which, largely Catholic in form and organization but Protestant in doctrine, occupied the middle ground. This included moderate men of all groups, but from it the more extreme Catholics and the more advanced Protestants, or Puritans as they came to be called, alike stood aloof. As one of the concrete results of this situation there arose three parties in church and state, divided from each other,

among other things, by the varying stress laid on authority. These, on account of the strongly religious character of the time and the movement, were defined in terms of the church, Catholic or conservative, Anglican or moderate, and Puritan or liberal.

Among these warring elements, Tudor dangers and Tudor governance preserved an uneasy peace throughout the sixteenth century. But as danger and governance alike declined on the accession of the Stuarts, as the Protestant and parliamentary doctrines which accompanied the continued rise of the middle classes gained ground, the Catholic party steadily grew weaker. Puritanism, developing meanwhile into a political as well as a religious force, correspondingly extended its boundaries, but in the process divided against itself. The result was that while under Elizabeth the Catholics had been the conservative element, by the outbreak of the Puritan Revolution in the reign of Charles I. they had practically disappeared as a political power among the people, and the Anglicans took their place as the conservative party. The moderate position of the latter was meanwhile assumed by a Puritan group known as Presbyterians, and the liberal ground occupied by a more radical Protestant group of advanced Puritans made up of several bodies, Baptists, Congregationalists, or Independents, and the like, presently known by the collective name of sectaries.

And as no great change in any one field of human activity is ever dissociated from other interests, the political evolution had closely paralleled that in the religious field. The doctrines of popular and national rights against the claims and encroachments of royalty had developed beside those of religious liberty, and closely connected with them. The attempt of the crown to turn back the hands of progressive liberalism in church and state served only to stimulate popular doctrines in both fields and to unite all elements against it. The result was an explosion known significantly as the Puritan Revolution. That outbreak did much to increase the numbers and power of the more advanced party, and to deepen the divisions between the previously somewhat nebulous groups, political and ecclesiastical. In particular the Third Party or more advanced element under Cromwell's leadership gained control of the army and finally secured the ascendancy in the state. From monarchy to Commonwealth, in the view of the most advanced party, the government might well have taken the final step and become a republic.

From that, the extreme republicans declared, it was prevented by the "arts" of the Protector, and when the nation seemed "likely to attain that measure of happiness which human beings are capable

of, by the ambition of one man the hopes and expectations of all good men were disappointed". But it is more reasonable to suppose, from our wider knowledge, that the pendulum would have swung back, that instead of setting up a republic two centuries before its time, the Protector would have been driven by circumstances and popular opinion to restore the older monarchical system with himself as king. Neither point was ever reached. On September 3, 1658, Cromwell died, and the fabric of government which by that time rested on little more than his great personal ability and ascendancy, fell to ruin. The various elements which supported him, but among which even he had held the balance with difficulty, at once fell apart, and English affairs were plunged into a warring chaos of religious and political anarchy. Men and ideas fought for mastery of public affairs which drifted meanwhile without guidance or direction.

The Protector's son Richard, who succeeded to his father's title "as peacefully as ever Prince of Wales came to the throne", found himself unable to control the officers of the army who drove his chief adviser, Thurloe, from power, dissolved the existing Parliament and, compelled by public opinion, summoned the remnants of the old Long Parliament. That body, torn by the conflicting interests of civil and military leaders, struggling for personal ends or ideals beyond the bounds of possibility, provoked the army oligarchs; and neither in army nor in Parliament was found a man strong enough to bear the burdens which Cromwell laid down. The new Protector left Whitehall; Charles's agents strove in vain to bring about his restoration; over-sanguine royalists rose in his behalf only to be suppressed, for the Council of State, in which executive power rested, though it was unable to construct was still able to protect itself against its enemies.

The situation was cleared up by the commander of the forces in Scotland, Monk. Supported by the civil leaders in the Council, by Parliament, and by public opinion in general, he made his way to London, despite Lambert's attempt to stop his progress. There he became the head of a new Council, dissolved the old Parliament, purged the army, secured the disaffected leaders, and summoned a new Parliament, the so-called Convention. With this he laid down the lines of a new political development. The conflict was transferred to the House of Commons, and there a coalition majority of Anglicans and so-called Presbyterians voted to restore monarchy. They made no terms, but the fact that the new monarch owed his crown to Parliament altered his position; for thenceforth the crown

was to contend for control of affairs not against Parliament, not without Parliament, but in Parliament, which thenceforth was supreme.

With this the whole position of the party system changed. "Roundhead and Cavalier were, in effect, no more; Whig and Tory not yet in being", and the Convention was divided between groups who took their names and opinions from the times just past—Royalist, Anglican, Presbyterian, Independent, Sectary. Such were the names applied to the existing groups, and these, it will be observed, were now defined largely in terms of church rather than of state. The Reformation spirit was still in evidence, but it was soon to turn to a more worldly quality. For in these various groups resided not merely an ecclesiastical difference, but a divergence of ideals in regard to government and policy, which, in general, found the royalists as the extreme exponents of authority in church and state, and so advanced to the extreme individualism of the most radical of the sectaries. Between these the so-called Presbyterians held the middle ground, and had it not been for events and sentiments beyond their power to control, they might—as they still hoped to do—hold the balance between the two extremes and so direct the coming policy.

In two directions, however, the political balance, hitherto not unfavorable to the Presbyterians, was weighted against them. The return of the king and court introduced a new element into affairs wholly favorable to Royalists and the Anglicans who might better henceforth be called the Royalist-Anglicans. The disbanding of the forces by land and sea, a measure dictated at once by prudence and economy, correspondingly weakened the cause of the sectaries, much of whose potential strength lay in the army and navy. The seizure and proscription of their leaders further diminished their power of union and left them still more at the mercy of their enemies. The filling up of the Lords by the entry of the bishops as well as of new peers aided the party of church and crown still more, and established a bulwark of conservatism which the efforts of thirty years were scarcely able to disturb. Thus, though nothing was actually taken away from the Presbyterians, their relative position was much changed, and the Council which was constituted with not more than a dozen of their number in a membership of thirty indicated the measure of their reduced importance. This was further manifested in their failure to obtain more than fair words and polite evasions in return for their efforts to secure some guaranties either from the king or the Commons for their form of worship. The most that could be gained was an act of indemnity securing

their persons, and a promise from the king to call a conference of leaders of the church to consider the religious question. Thus the Royalist-Anglicans, while their position was being strengthened, succeeded in their efforts to postpone to a more favorable time the consideration of those fundamental questions of political and constitutional importance which it was no part of their policy to settle in an assembly not summoned by the king nor controlled by his partizans.

Such were the elements from which this new political world was to be made. And in spite of the transitory nature of the Convention and its acts, certain permanent conditions of political life were foreshadowed in its course. The first was that the machinery which had sufficed for the old order would not answer for the new. It was evident that measures were no longer to be carried by gaining the royal ear nor did preferment lie that way alone. The crown, though still powerful, was now but one of several factors in affairs. It was not long before men ambitious of advancement recognized that royal favor was only one means to that end, and that even such favor was more than likely to be extended chiefly to those who had strength in Parliament. It was equally obvious that individuals as such could have at best but a limited influence among five hundred of their fellows. Some new device to direct this new power was therefore necessary, and that, as it gradually appeared, lay in but one direction, organization. It was, of course, many years before leaders were able to dispense with royal favor altogether, but as time went on the more far-sighted politicians depended on it less and less. That process is the measure of the increasing power of the Commons, and the perfection of the means used to control it, in short the development of the political party.

The full meaning of this was, of course, withheld from those who in the early months of 1661 busied themselves with the choice of members for the new Parliament which was to solve this and many other such questions. In this general election to an even greater extent than in the choice of the Convention, the men and measures of the Commonwealth were ignored. The lines between the parliamentary groups were more sharply drawn than a year before. Not a few Anglicans had been ready to admit some lay voice in church government; many Presbyterians would have accepted a limited episcopacy. A large section of the so-called Church of England, clergy and laity alike, were Presbyterian, and the term Dissenter could be applied to scarcely any beside those who, like the Quakers, were beyond any possible inclusion in an episcopal church. But with the rise of the Anglicans to power all this was changed.

For the majority, meanwhile, had grown in other ways than in numbers. They had a recognized leader in the minister, Clarendon, the beginnings of an organization, and a set of principles which they seized their advantage to put in practice.

Their position was rapidly defined and established by legislation. Foremost among their measures was a series of statutes often known as the Persecuting Acts. Passed under alarm of sectary plots, these established the doctrine of conformity to a state church as the basis of religious and political privilege. By the Act of Uniformity Presbyterian ministers and laymen were driven from the church; by the Corporation Act Dissenters were excluded from borough corporations which returned four-fifths of the membership of the Commons. The Conventicle Act made Nonconformist assemblies unlawful, and the Five Mile Act separated the dissenting ministers from their congregations. Control of the church and the Commons having thus been, as it was thought, effectually secured, the fear of the sectaries was again invoked to secure the repeal of the old Triennial Act. By this time was gained to reconstitute the boroughs in the Royalist-Anglican interest, and to leave the life of this ultra-loyal Parliament dependent on royal will. But reactionary legislation did not end here. Another series of statutes confirmed and completed the ascendancy of church and crown. The ancient dignity and power of the crown was restored in so far as possible. The militia was put in royal hands and a standing army organized avowedly to guard against the sectaries. The right of petition and publication was closely restricted, and arbitrary imprisonment freely practised, ostensibly against the same danger. The feudal burden of taxation was lifted from the landed classes and replaced by an excise on the people at large, upon whom was presently imposed an equally unpopular hearth tax. The indigent Cavaliers were voted a sum for their losses, and were much more largely recompensed by place and pension. Foreign affairs—apart from the unpopular marriage of Charles to the Catholic Infanta of Portugal and the no less unpopular sale of Dunkirk to the French—were comparatively neglected.

Such, in brief, was the Clarendonian programme. In it may be recognized certain ideas which echo the traditions of pre-rebellion royalism, and others which anticipate the doctrines of future Toryism. On these grounds Clarendon has sometimes been described as an old royalist, sometimes as the founder of the Tory party. But at least two circumstances prevent the identification of his policy with that of either of these schools. On the one hand, he made no

attempt to perpetuate the fatal doctrine of unparliamentary taxation. On the other, he opposed all attempts to grant the crown power to dispense with Parliament in ecclesiastical affairs. In consequence the minister has sometimes been called the founder of the Whigs.

In fact Clarendon and his followers were neither Whigs nor Tories, nor even pre-rebellion Cavaliers. Though they were nearer the position of moderate Toryism and old parliamentary royalism, they were essentially a party of transition, occupying middle ground between the old and new conservatism. Under stress of circumstance many of them in later years entered the Tory ranks. But at the outset they were essentially a party of church and crown, upholding the king against parliamentary encroachment, and the bishops against dissent, yet only less fearful of unlimited monarchy than of wider liberty in church and state, no less opposed to pure prerogative than to complete parliamentary supremacy. Their leader resisted with equal vigor a permanent income which would make the crown independent of Parliament, and the investigation of royal accounts by commissioners of the Commons. And even the Persecuting Acts, which were largely political rather than religious in their aims, never excluded Dissenters as such from Parliament. Fully enforced they would have destroyed nonconformity in its political if not in its religious aspects. But that proved impossible and, accompanied by complete schism between Anglican and Presbyterian clergy, their chief result was a division in English politics, society, and religious affairs which remains the chief permanent contribution of the Clarendonians to the development of English politics.

Yet scarcely did the Clarendonian victory seem assured when it proved at once transient and illusory. The Nonconformists were, indeed, driven from place in church and borough, the revolutionaries suppressed, the taxes collected, the foreign policy carried out. At first the fear of setting out on his travels again, and the novel pleasures of royalty, restrained the king. The minister seemed indispensable despite his virtues. The country was filled with uninquiring loyalty and the fear of the sectaries, and the extravagance of a dissolute court had not as yet demoralized finance, despite the fact that the financial system, never of the best, was now complicated by the hatred of an unpopular tax. But as soon as England felt the full pressure of the Clarendonian policy it became evident that two powerful elements were antagonized—those desiring enlargement of the prerogative and those desiring wider parliamen-

tary powers. And, curiously enough, these found a meeting-place on the common ground of greater religious freedom.

Upon the passage of the Persecuting Acts which they had so vainly opposed, many Presbyterians conformed enough to secure their political rights, without abandoning their stand for toleration and popular government. The rest threw in their lot with the sectaries, oppressed in pocket and faith, and offering a fertile field for political opposition extending from electoral contests to mob violence and conspiracy. In the former activity, at least, they gained the aid and sympathy of their so-called occasional or semi-conformist brethren. England was henceforth divided into two camps, conformist and nonconformist, the one with, the other without full political privilege, and a permanent separation was assured by which the dissenting element was crystallized into a well-defined group thenceforth to be reckoned with in all political arithmetic. Into the church the Dissenters never returned, but before the roll of acts against them was complete they began to find their way back into the borough corporations, from which legislation proved powerless to exclude them. Thence they were able presently to reinforce the liberal party in the Commons.

In such manner and on such lines was the division into parties begun. Within three years after the Restoration two well-defined groups stood fairly opposed to each other in church and state, in Parliament and country alike. Their initial separation had come on the question of limitation of authority, first of the king, then of the bishops. The Royalist-Anglicans, successful in both contentions for a time, remained the dominant power in the state. The Presbyterians, failing in both, now fell back, with the sectaries, on the principle of toleration.

That principle meanwhile found support on different grounds and in a far different quarter, from no less a person than the king himself. Charles was not impelled to toleration by abstract theory, much less by love of Protestant nonconformity. Nor, as Clarendon believed, was he influenced wholly by the young and ambitious men whom the chancellor had repressed and antagonized. Whatever religious sympathies he had lay in the direction of Catholicism, as his simple political prepossessions were all for absolutism. His motive therefore was rather to relieve Catholic disabilities and to increase the royal prerogative. In neither of these designs was he likely to find support from Clarendon. He turned therefore to other quarters. The first step was to establish a following of his own in Council and Commons, composed largely of courtiers and

placemen, in short King's Friends, dependent on his favor and following his lead, equally removed in principle and in personnel from the Clarendonians and their opponents. To this group the young men neglected by the chancellor were attracted, especially those "frequent and confident speakers" who aspired to gain by royal support the position denied them by the minister. The royal managers took advantage of the by-elections to enlarge this group in the Commons, where even "the king's menial servants, as well below as above stairs", found place in increasing numbers. At the same time the minister's friends in the Council were gradually replaced by those of the king, and thus was built up that group presently known collectively as the Court.

With the rise of this group we come at once into closer touch with the development of modern political management and method. In these the Clarendonians were at first even more old-fashioned than in their principles. Beyond admonitions to the departing Convention with such personal influence as could be exerted by ministers, courtiers, and royalists generally, and some interference with the posts, Clarendon seems to have made little effort to carry the general election of 1661, nor perhaps under the circumstances was much necessary. When Parliament assembled he uttered some rebuke of the license which had accompanied the elections, sharpened, no doubt, by the somewhat exorbitant bill for hospitality incurred in the election of his own son. But besides this, neither then nor later does the chancellor seem to have concerned himself much with the direct choice of members, perhaps through inability, perhaps in accordance with the more dignified traditions in which he had been reared. In the management of the House, once chosen, on the other hand, he showed diligence and system. With the treasurer he directed the ministerial lieutenants in the Commons, who met sometimes with the chancellor and treasurer, sometimes without them, to plan measures and methods. Among them one, Sir Hugh Pollard, acted as a sort of House manager. Here lay the germs of a political mechanism, with at least the beginnings of party leadership, a cabinet, a ministry, and party whips. And if "all places of trust and profit" went to those who supported the minister, this was not new in English politics, nor was it long confined to his following. On the other hand, in so far as the opposition held together at all, it was by personal conferences of leading men, whose party was, in general, rather an active guerrilla force, "without intelligence, command or pay", than a disciplined body. Neither with them nor with the Clarendonians did electoral management proper begin.

That, as we have seen, owed its origin chiefly to the new power or party of the court. In its activities from the first were found the beginnings of electioneering management, and the parliamentary methods of later years. It was no long time before it established a new alignment of parties and policies as well.

When the bills against nonconformity were introduced, this group had made strong efforts to modify them by proposing a measure which gave the crown power to dispense with the acts. Failing this, they tried to insert dispensing clauses in the acts themselves. And when this was defeated they evolved a more radical plan. This was to unite Protestant and Catholic Dissenters, secure the power of indulgence from or in spite of Parliament, and so gain tolerance for Rome under guise of tenderness for Geneva, while incidentally exalting the prerogative. In this they were not alone. When Anglican intolerance seemed likely to stamp out freedom of belief, many men of all shades of opinion turned to the crown as the only bulwark against persecution. Presbyterian as well as Catholic councillors urged on the policy which culminated in the issue of a Declaration of Indulgence in 1663. But in this the so-called Presbyterian leaders were not followed by their namesakes in the Commons. These feared Catholicism and prerogative more than Anglican persecution. The declaration had to be withdrawn, the Nonconformist councillors were estranged from their party, and the Clarendonians for the time remained supreme. In this early conflict appears first the strength of that "boudoir cabinet" or "cabal" upon whose solemn councils in Lady Castlemaine's apartment the attention of historians has often been centred.

Against the chancellor's religious policy the alliance of King's Friends and Nonconformist councillors, deserted by those who otherwise were their natural allies, the Commons opposition, strove in vain. But on the more purely political side after 1663 they found more success. During the period of Cromwellian supremacy the mercantile classes, themselves largely Puritan, had received extensive recognition from the government, expressing itself in the Navigation Act and the war against Holland. The Restoration continued this activity. But though the Clarendonians interested themselves greatly in such matters, re-enacted the Navigation Laws and passed many measures to encourage and regulate manufactures, agriculture, and commerce, in at least two directions they failed to meet fully commercial and agricultural demands. From the operation of restrictive measures for English benefit Ireland was relieved, and English commercial interests, however furthered by diplomacy,

were not considered, in the state of the nation, worthy of war. These commercial interests lay largely in the hands of Nonconformists, against whom the Clarendonians thus joined economic to religious and political discrimination, while at the same time antagonizing a section of the landed interest by permitting Irish competition.

To some of the rising group of King's Friends opposed to the chancellor, these matters appealed with much force. Reared in the school of Cromwell they favored toleration, a highly restrictive commercial policy, economy and efficiency in administration, and a vigorous attitude in foreign affairs, basing itself on economic grounds. They took further advantage of the waning interest in purely religious matters evidenced by the smaller divisions on such questions, and of the opposition always created by such a constructive programme as that of the Clarendonians. Subordinating for a time the assault on the ministerial church policy, they attacked the chancellor on diplomatic and commercial issues. In this they regained the support they had lost by their religious policy and much beside.

Their first victory was won on the issue of a war with Holland. This, after much resistance, was forced upon the minister. The weakness, incompetence, and corruption of administration charged upon him in the course of that struggle enabled his enemies to rouse the country against him. Over his protest a measure of high protection, sometimes called the foundation of that policy in England, the Irish Cattle Bill, was enacted, and the land-owning class largely drawn away from him. Against his even more fervent protest the investigation of the finances and the auditing of administrative accounts by parliamentary commissioners was put forward, and a beginning made of appropriation for specific purposes by Parliament. And at last, in the closing months of 1667, his opponents, the King's Friends at their head, with royal aid, contrived to secure a majority against him in the Commons and, though failing to impeach him, succeeded in driving him from power, from place, and finally from England itself. With his fall the first act of Restoration politics and of the foundation of modern political parties came to an end. In it had been developed the opposing principles of administration based on the relative power and position of the executive and legislature, a definition of religious issue and policy and the relation of church and state, an alignment of groups on those issues, an economic and an administrative policy, with the beginnings of party organization and parliamentary management.

Clarendon was succeeded by a ministry of five councillors who

had opposed him, known as the Cabal. They were all Nonconformists, three nominally Protestants, one openly Catholic, and one secretly inclined to that faith. As a ministry they occupied a peculiar position. Unlike Clarendon they had the support of the king; but they had no such following as the late minister's party in Parliament. They were, in fact, almost equally removed from the Clarendonians and Presbyterians, antagonizing the former by their tolerant policy and the latter by their devotion to the prerogative. For if the Presbyterians were not minded to follow them in a policy of indulgence by royal edict, still less were the Clarendonians inclined to favor a party which encouraged nonconformity. Their main reliance therefore, apart from the popularity of certain measures they promoted, was upon the group of King's Friends in the Commons. Upon the head of the Cabal, then and since, the vials of wrath have been generously poured by all parties alike. Their position was indeed anomalous and insecure. Even more than the Clarendonians they represented a transition from old to new. In a sense they were less a parliamentary ministry than a group of personal advisers of the king, and on the whole, apart from political prejudice of its rivals, the instinct which led to the denunciation of such a system as theirs was sound. Yet the doctrines represented by the Cabal were, with perhaps two exceptions, liberal and enlightened. As privy councillors they had stood for toleration, a vigorous foreign and commercial policy, financial reform, and high protection. They signalized their entrance into power by allowing the acts against nonconformity to lapse, in so far as possible, by releasing many political and religious prisoners, by signing the Triple Alliance with Holland and Sweden against France, by at least acquiescing in a measure which enabled Parliament to supervise expenditure, and by reorganizing the administration on a more businesslike and economical basis.

In this initial programme of the Cabal, taken in connection with the acts of this group before their accession to power, we may recognize at once certain doctrines which reflect the Cromwellian policies and at the same time anticipate many of the principles later associated with the name of Whig. Yet the Cabal was no more Cromwellian or Whig than the Clarendonians were Laudian or Tory. For, on the one hand, it was so far from advanced Protestantism that it included at least one Catholic, and, on the other, it departed so far from the ideas of popular government that it leaned on the king rather than on Parliament. It attracted support to some of its measures by their unquestioned excellence. But in the minds of

most men no virtue of its measures could compensate for the fundamental vice of the way it was constituted and maintained in power. This alienated the independent element of country gentlemen in the Commons no less than the Clarendonians and Presbyterians, and the ministry never attained a stable majority in the Commons. This defect it endeavored to remedy in three ways, all of importance in the evolution of parties. It pacified the disaffected elements in the nation at large so far as possible by concessions. It drew its followers in the lower house closer to itself by increasing rewards, and recruited able men by place and dignities. It adopted and greatly extended the policy begun by the court of securing through bye-elections members devoted to its support; and thus it contributed greatly to the evolution of political machinery, electoral and parliamentary. And it not only threw the whole weight of administration thus into the parliamentary scale, but it even invoked the royal prerogative of adjournment and prorogation as a regular weapon of parliamentary warfare, in which the speaker, as the agent of the administration, played a leading part.

The result was that in length of session and in legislation Parliament under the Cabal played a slighter part than at almost any other period of its history, while the conflict between the opposing parties in the House grew more and more acrimonious. The opposition to the Cabal in Commons and country consequently rose to a great height, especially among the Anglicans of all shades of opinion. They saw personified in the ministry the hateful policy of Catholic toleration and exaltation of the prerogative in a new form. Even the Protestant Dissenters who gained most from the measures of the Cabal, looked upon it with suspicion as favoring doctrines which they hated even more than they feared the Anglicans. For some three years this ministry by exercising all its arts was able, in spite of its enemies, to maintain its position. But in 1670 a series of events marked a turning-point in its career, in English affairs generally, and in the evolution of parties particularly.

The royal and ministerial protection of the sectaries had greatly irritated the majority in the Commons, still strongly Anglican, and it made several attempts to re-enact the Seditious Conventicles Act after its expiration in 1668. These had been frustrated by adjournment, prorogation, and similar devices of the administration. But in 1670 the measure was re-enacted, though with a clause giving dispensing power to the crown. The immediate result was a burst of Nonconformist opposition which, especially in London, took the form of riots that had almost the appearance of civil war.

In the very days when his guards were attempting to repress these disturbances the king entered on the final stage of his plan to make himself independent of Parliament in finance and religion, and incidentally and unconsciously set party development on another stage. Under cover of festivities accompanying the visit of his sister, the Duchess of Orleans, he signed at Dover a treaty unknown to his Protestant advisers with agents of his cousin, Louis XIV., by which he secured a promise of French aid in establishing Catholicism in England if and when it seemed feasible, in return for English non-interference in French schemes of aggrandizement on the Continent. Six months later Charles's nephew, William of Orange, made his first visit to England.

With these events the final transformation of parties began. To the issues already defined were now added two others, the French alliance and the question of succession. And, as such matters always tend to personify themselves in an individual, the king's brother and heir presumptive, James, duke of York, came to be identified with Catholicism, to which he was a convert, with prerogative, and the French interest. Against him, after the failure of an attempt to divorce and remarry the king in hope of a legitimate Protestant heir, two alternative candidates presented themselves to those opposed to a Catholic succession. The one was the king's illegitimate son James, duke of Monmouth, the other was the king's nephew, William of Orange. About these, as time went on, the general issues tended to crystallize, though for nearly three years more the Protestant section of the Cabal, at first ignorant of the Dover treaty and the deeper springs of royal policy, strove to mould the king to their views and at the same time maintain themselves in or against Parliament by means of the Court party and the prerogative.

Especially was this true in political contests outside the Commons. It is often said that election management sprung full-armed from the general election of 1679. But that great contest was less the origin than the climax of those methods which developed during the reign of Charles II. Under the Cabal, especially between 1670 and 1673, were perfected nearly all those devices begun by the court ten years before which have generally been regarded as products of a later age. The flagrant abuses which then arose led the Commons to enunciate two important principles: that the choice of members should be free from royal interference, and that the House alone should control its own elections and membership. Besides the manipulation of the electorate, the management of members within the

House grew with equal pace. Bribery and corruption were more and more fully practised, the power of the crown more and more openly invoked. In spite of this, partly, no doubt, because of it, the balance gradually turned against the administration. The weight of national opinion outside Parliament was thrown against royal and ministerial authority, and found its way into the Commons through by-elections in spite of the most strenuous efforts of the court and ministry.

In this final struggle the factions in Parliament tended to divide on slightly different lines. The old Clarendonians and Presbyterians remained, but sunk to less importance as groups in new divisions. They were, said a great politician of the time, but clogs to the real issue which lay between the rising parties of Court and Country. The former had as a nucleus the King's Friends, courtiers, placemen, pensioners, with high prerogative and high church men, some old Cavaliers, lords' sons, and such as from principle or interest adhered to royal or ministerial or ecclesiastical leadership. The Country party on the other hand united the "Switzer band" of Presbyterians with many of that middle group of independent country gentlemen which now tended to be absorbed in the extremes, and with new men coming in through by-elections. It not merely gained adherents from this latter source, it was recruited by men of a different stamp. A new generation was entering politics at this turning-point between revolution and revolution, to take its place beside the old Cavaliers and Presbyterians. The opposition presently began to rival the court in numbers and ability, if not in leadership and organization, and a set of well-defined principles took the place of its older policy of mere opposition. Its weakest point was in its leadership, which was still a loose oligarchy of its principal men, but some germs of a caucus system made their appearance, and a more united and effective conduct of their common interests in and out of the House naturally followed.

Such changes naturally had their effect on the public outside. After the final burst of Anglican zeal and Nonconformist resistance in 1670, the fear of the Catholics replaced the fear of the sectaries. The Dissenters publicly repudiated a tolerance which identified them with the Catholics, and the more reasonable Anglicans recognized the position of their former antagonists. In the face of a common danger the more moderate men of all Protestant persuasions began to draw together, and it was no long time before measures were introduced looking toward toleration for Protestant Nonconformists. Thus, as the lines were more sharply drawn, the in-

determinate centre, whose votes had earlier turned the issue in the Commons toward Anglican triumph, swayed the other way; and finally divided as we have seen to the advantage of the Country party. The climax of the situation and of this phase of party evolution was reached in the circumstances accompanying the second Dutch war which began in the spring of 1672. As a preliminary to the measures determined upon, Parliament was prorogued and thus precluded from any possible interference with the plans of the administration. The declaration of war was prefaced by two arbitrary acts. To secure a sum of ready money, payment from the exchequer was suspended, and to pacify a section of the opposition a Declaration of Indulgence was issued granting permission to the Dissenters to establish conventicles licensed by the crown. Hostilities were begun before war was declared, by a treacherous and futile attempt to seize the homeward-bound Dutch Smyrna fleet. Here appeared the policy of the Court in its most extreme form—toleration by royal prerogative, finance by royal edict, a vigorous, mercenary foreign policy, and the exclusion of Parliament from all three, while behind these lay the secret arrangement between the king and his cousin, Louis XIV., and the avowed Catholicism of the heir to the English throne.

When the Houses met again the Country party, now with a clear majority in the Commons on such questions, set forth in turn their policy. They repudiated the obligations the ministry had incurred by the stop of the exchequer on the ground that this involved unparliamentary taxation. They forced the king to recall the Declaration of Indulgence and resolved that the power to regulate ecclesiastical as well as financial affairs belonged to Parliament alone. They demanded that the troops raised for the Dutch war be disbanded, on the same ground of parliamentary control. They declared for peace with the Dutch and hostility to France, an encroachment on the royal prerogative, the king declared later, without precedent save in time of revolution. Finally a bill was introduced for the ease of Protestant Dissenters and the programme completed by the passage of the Test Act which excluded Catholics from all office, civil and military.

The result was decisive. James and his allies were driven from place and power. The king's Catholic policy was destroyed at a blow, and Catholicism eliminated from open activity in English politics. The prerogative in foreign affairs was attacked, and the question of the Protestant succession brought into the realm of practical politics. The defense of his prerogative and his pension, de-

rived from the French alliance, and of his house, personified in James, henceforth absorbed the king's energies.

Meanwhile two of the Protestant section of the Cabal, Shaftesbury and Buckingham, advised of the king's bad faith, and marking the signs of the times, trimmed their course to meet or direct the storm. The former was dismissed and at once entered into direct relations with the Country party. He was followed by others, among whom Buckingham was most prominent. The opposition was thus strengthened not merely by its new allies in the Lords; in the person of Shaftesbury was supplied the principal element it had hitherto in great measure lacked, a recognized leader of ability and resource. He, in turn, found ready to his hand a political weapon and a situation peculiarly suited to his genius and purpose. He did not create the party, nor was he in any real sense its founder. But he took command of the able men of the new generation, like Sacheverell, who had done so much to give the party its new form, as well as of the older Presbyterian leaders whom the new men had themselves in some measure replaced. Shaftesbury was a master politician, and under his guidance the party took on new form and vigor. It was gradually welded into a machine, including all elements from the liberal Lords to the London mob, Presbyterians, moderate country gentlemen, and sectaries.

The evolution of the Country party was now nearly complete. It had increased its numbers till it was prepared to contend with its opponents on fairly equal terms. It had developed a set of principles based on toleration, commercial interest, liberty of the subject, Protestantism, and parliamentary supremacy. It had acquired a leader, and a small but able following in the Lords. It needed but one thing, some force to counterbalance the more effective organization of the court. That was quickly supplied. In 1675 was founded the so-called Green Ribbon Club which, from its headquarters at King's Head Tavern, soon became the recognized centre of the party, the seat of its executive and of its inner councils. There party policies were formulated by the group of leaders about Shaftesbury, and methods improved or invented to further them. Systematic political management in and out of the House was developed. The loose political connection was drilled and disciplined into a party, and the last superiority of the court was equalized by this new leadership and organization which rapidly developed the principles and practices of the later Whig party.

Against this, on the part of the court, the Council was reorganized by the introduction of moderate Protestant lords. The conduct

of affairs was placed in the hands of the ablest upholder of church and crown, Thomas Osborne, presently created Earl of Danby. He began at once to unite more closely the courtiers in the Commons, the Clarendonian remnant, old high church and prerogative men, King's Friends, placemen and pensioners, into a reorganized Court party. In the Lords, the crown could rely on a steady majority of spiritual and temporal peers. In and out of the House it extended still further the policy of corruption and management. It gave up the Catholic policy. And though the king held to his French connection and pension, Danby repudiated both, and like Shaftesbury before him, though on different grounds, sought to mould the king to his own plans, and stand between king and Commons, directing both along conservative lines. With this the circle was complete.

The parliamentary session of 1675 saw the first engagement between the forces thus constituted and officered. On the part of the court the royal pretension to supremacy in church affairs and a Catholic policy were tacitly abandoned for a programme of extreme conformity to be enacted by Parliament and enforced by the crown. One of the earliest measures was a passive obedience bill introduced into the Lords. To this was added a plea for the traditional balance of king, Lords, and Commons, and the resistance to parliamentary encroachment on the prerogative especially in foreign affairs. Insistence on ministerial rights, the undiminished power of the executive, and the direct legitimate succession completed a programme which combined the ideas of Clarendon and the court, modified to meet the existing situation. Against this the Country party sought to identify the court with Catholicism and arbitrary government, both of which they denounced. They protested against a standing army and a French policy. They demanded greater liberty of the subject, free and frequent parliamentary sessions, control of finance and a voice in foreign affairs for the Commons, toleration, ministerial responsibility, and general parliamentary supremacy, in short the principles of the Bill of Rights.

With this the plea for strong government and the superiority of the executive stood out clearly against that for popular government and the superiority of the legislature. For some three years the political conflict was confined to these issues. Perhaps if the ordinary political processes had not been interrupted, or personal rivalries had not been so acute, the situation might have gradually worked itself out along evolutionary rather than revolutionary lines. But neither side would wait, perhaps neither side could wait. The Popish Plot accelerated the movement of affairs, which hurried on

to the crisis of the Exclusion Bill. After a brief interval of quiet, reaction and revolution revived with the accession of James. Country and Court in that troubled decade from 1675 to 1685 gave place to Petitioner and Abhorrer, and these to Whig and Tory. Corruption rose to a height not exceeded under the arch-tempter Walpole; the prerogative was strained to the breaking-point; political agitation was carried to a height scarcely short of revolution. But, apart from change of name and greater intensity of rivalry, English party principles, methods, organization, even personnel, changed little after 1675. The Tory party which emerged from the Revolution differed in no essential particular from the Court party which completed its evolution under Danby. The Whigs were to all intents the Country party with its allies and leaders in the Lords.

The details of political practice alter with changing conditions. But it was not until the electorate itself was revolutionized in the nineteenth century that even these departed in any radical degree from the lines laid down between 1660 and 1675. There, if anywhere, it would appear, are to be found the beginnings of English parties on the lines we have laid down.

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